Abstract-The security and privacy of the tag carrier has become the bottle neck of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system development further. In this paper, we propose a robust authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which meets the requirement of resource-limited RFID systems. Our protocol achieves mutual authentication and possesses lightweight feature by reducing the computation cost over the tag end. Moreover, the proposed protocol possesses remarkable security properties in RFID system and the immunity against the possible malicious attacks as well as an excellent performance through the detailed security analysis. Performance evaluation and function comparison demonstrate that our protocol makes a balance between cost and security in RFID authentication protocol. Compared to the previous relevant RFID authentication protocols, our protocol improves efficiency, enhances robustness, which is well suitable for RFID tags with the scarceness of resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is increasingly becoming more popular in every aspect of our lives and works, which is expected to replace the current barcode technology in the near future. RFID is a wireless technology that allows the communication with passively powered devices, which plays a key role for identification purposes in the wide application scenarios of supply chain management, the anticounterfeiting of luxury goods, manufacturing, microchip fabrication industries, credit cards, e-passports, etc. Due to the intrinsic insecurity of the open wireless channel between the readers and the tags, security and privacy concerns [1] of RFID technology appears to be one of the most challenging areas. RFID systems are confronted with different security threats [2] , such as eavesdropping, intercepting, modification, counterfeiting, traffic analysis, traceability, desynchronization etc. The need for privacy-preserving RFID protocols is evident [3~5] , which is the fundamental solution to various security threats in RFID system. However, it is difficult to provide secure and privacy-preserving authentication protocols [6] in extremely constrained RFID systems with respect to memory, power, and energy of the tags.
Public Key Cryptography (PKC) based authentication significantly simplies the distribution of cryptographic keys. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is emerging as an attractive public-key cryptosystem for mobile/wireless environments. The challenge of applying ECC in RFID environment is how to deal with the relative high computation cost associated with ECC algorithms to the resource-limited RFID platform. In 2007, Vaudenay [7] provided a formal model for RFID protocols and proved that PKC can assure the highest level of feasible privacy in RFID applications. ECC has gained much importance due to the equivalent security lever with the smaller key sizes, faster computations, lower power consumptions, as well as memory and bandwidth savings compared to traditional cryptosystems like RSA, so it is a promising primitive for passive RFID tags to provide various public-key services. Moreover, Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) can be regarded as one of the hardest mathematical problem among the public-key cryptosystem. Recently, the implementations in the field of RFID systems [8, 9] have shown that ECC is ready for RFID tags. Consequently, ECC increasingly becomes one of the most popular public-key cryptosystem to be applied widely in extremely constrained RFID systems in terms of memory type, power source and computation ability.
In this paper, we design an efficient authentication protocol based on ECC for resource-limited RFID systems. Compared with the previous related works, the proposed protocol has remarkable features as follows:
(1) Ensures security and privacy requirements by ECDLP and meanwhile avoids the risks neglected by previous ECC-based authentication protocols.
(2) Possesses remarkable privacy properties and the resistence to the typical malicious attacks considered in RFID systems. *Corresponding author: qinxcs@nuaa.edu.cn (3) Minimizes the computation cost on the tags to meet the implementation restrictions and puts the costly operations over the reader end, which makes it suitable for low-cost RFID systems.
(4) Equilibrates properly both security and performace for extremely constrained passive RFID tags.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present a critical review of the related work in Section 2. In Section 3 we then review some preliminaries briefly. Next our lightweight RFID authentication protocol based on ECC (LRAP) is described in Section 4. Section 5 addresses the presentations of security analysis. The performance evaluation is analyzed in Session 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
The research literatures of RFID authentication protocols are already quite extensive and growing, trying to solve RFID security and privacy problems. However, they all have certain flaws and vulnerabilities.
A Some research literatures focus on the hardware implementation of PKC on RFID tags. A recent work of Wolkerstorfer [16] is the first to claim that it is possible to have low-power and compact implementation of ECC, which meets the constraints imposed by EPC standards. Moreover, many authors investigated [8, 9, 17 ] the possibility of building RFID hardware that is capable of performing public key algorithms based on ECC.
In the following, PKC based RFID authentication protocols have been proposed. In 2011, Batina et al. [18] first proposed a privacy-preserving grouping-proof RFID protocol based on ECC. But Lv et al. [19] proved that the protocol [18] failed to resist the tracking attack and lost the untraceability. In the same article [19] , Lv et al. proposed an intensive protocol. But in 2012, Wen-Tsai et al. pointed that [19] is impracticable for the public-key cryptography in [20] . In 2008, Sheikh et al. put forward ERAP [21] . In 2009, Santi et al. proposed a secure elliptic curve-based RFID protocol (SECRP) [22] . These protocols ensure the security and privacy of RFID tags and readers, but they really need a lot of resource to complete the whole processing of these protocols.
From the above analysis of the previous protocols, we can find that these schemes all have the deficiency, which make them vulnerable to various malicious attacks. This paper aims to propose a new lightweight RFID authentication protocol based on ECC to enhance robustness and improve efficiency.
III. PRELIMINARIES

A. RFID System Model
The typical RFID system model has three components: Tags, Readers and a Backend Database. It is generally assumed that the channel between the readers and the backend database with higher performance is a secure link, so these two parts can be regarded as a whole. Tags are wireless transponders attached to objects for detection. Readers are transceivers that can query tags for identification of objects. The wireless channel between readers and tags established by readers is generally regarded as insecure link on account of confronting more serious circumstances, such as various malicious attacks. The backend database is the only trusted entity to all the tags and readers that may share some secret information with the authenticated tags.
Each tag will get a unique identifier ID during the enrollment, as well as an associated secret key K, which are written into the ROM memory of the authenticated tags and can not be revealed to any unauthorized entities. Besides, each tag has an Index as pseudonym for replacing ID to be transmitted over the wireless channel. Each index is written into the EEPROM memory of the authenticated tags and it will be used for authentication by updating after each successful session. During the enrollment, the backend database stores a list which contains the corresponding secret information of each authorized tag. The authorized reader can obtain the entry of the backend database by this access list. If a reader is authorized to access the tags T 1 , T 2 …, T n , after authenticating itself to the backend database, the reader will get its access list. The Index information of the authenticated tags in backend database is listed in , whose discriminant is non null, along with the point at infinity. Definition 2. Elliptic Curve Point-Addition Operation The neutral element of this operation is the point at infinity and the set of points is an Abelian group. Elliptic Curve Point-Addition Operation is a scalar n multiple point P, denoted as nP, which means n times addition of point P.
Let G be an additive cyclic group generated by the point P, whose order is a prime order q>2 k . Practically we can think of G as an additive subgroup of points over an elliptical curve E for a secure parameter k ∈ E. The 
inverse problem of Elliptic Curve Point-Addition Operation is ECDLP described as follows.
Definition 3. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
Given two group elements P, Q∈G, to find an integer a∈Z q * , such that Q = aP whenever such an integer exists, which turns out to be computationally hard to solve. To achieve the same security level in cryptosystems, the key requirements based on ECC is shorter than those based on RSA. The details are shown in TABLE II.
IV. OUR PROTOCOL LRAP
A. Notations
We use the notations for entities and operations as summarized in TABLE III to simplify description.
B. LRAP
LRAP comprises four stages: Initial Setup phase, Tag Identification phase, Mutual Authentication phase, and Updating phase. The length of all the information mentioned in LRAP is L-bits (96bits), which is compatible with all the encoding schemes (i.e. GTIN, GRAI) defined by EPCGlobal. Fig. I . illustrates the specification of our protocol in the appendix. The details of one authentication session are presented below.
Initial Setup Phase
(1) TDS selects two big prime numbers p 1 , q 1 ∈ Z q * and sets
* as the decryption key of the genuine tag and computes the encryption key K e of the genuine reader as
(3) TDS puts K e into the genuine reader and put K d into the genuine tag. (4) The genuine tag T keeps its decryption key K d secret and the genuine reader R keeps its encryption key K e and N secret.
Tag Identification Phase
(1) R→T: R sends a "Hello" message to T as a query to initiate a new protocol session. This action will also power T and make it possible to complete the authentication process.
(2) T→R: Upon receiving R's query, T will respond to R with its current Index-pseudonym IDS. ① R generates two L-bit pseudo random numbers
as the plaintext by applying with PRNG [25] ; ② R computes the ciphertext
by using PRNG [25] and then computes ③If A' is equal to A, R is authenticated successfully and it makes sure that T decrypts the plaintext ) , ( 2 1 n n from R correctly, and that means and R is a genuine reader;
Otherwise, T will do nothing and R is regarded as the fake reader because the received messages may be modified by an adversary on the wireless channel between R and T or sent by an unauthenticated reader. So this current session is abandoned and T waits for proceeding with the next authentication session. If B' is equal to B, T is authenticated successfully, and that means T is a genuine tag, which indicates that R considers T with this unique ID as detected and proceeds with the next Updating Phase. So this current Mutual-Authentication session is valid.
Otherwise, T is regarded as the fake tag. So this current session is abandoned and T waits for proceeding with the next authentication session.
Updating Phase
After completing the mutual authentication phase successfully, R and T will update and synchronize the local value of IDS to resist tracking attack.
(1) Tag Updating After authenticating R and then sending the message B to R, T will update its local value IDS as follows: IDS old = IDS; . And then R will send the updating value IDS to TDS. Till now, the protocol runs a whole round and the next authentication session will start from Tag Identification Phase.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze the security performance of LRAP.
A. Data Confidentiality and Data Integrity
In the wireless channel between R and T, ID of the genuine tag is replaced by its current Index-pseudonym IDS as the response. In addition, all exchanged messages over the wireless channel mask the secret values of the unique identity ID, the encryption key K e and the decryption key K d with the random numbers ) , , ( and B, not being interpolated in the wireless channel between the tags and the readers. The verification of the consistency between the local version and the received version ensures the integrity of these secret values. If an adversary succeeds to modify the exchanged data over the wireless channel, the consistency verification will fail and the adversary can also be recognized. Hence, data integrity is also guaranteed.
B. Tag Anonymity
Only the authorized reader can identify the tag by its current Index-pseudonym IDS along with its corresponding tag entry in TDS. As the unique identity ID of the genuine tag is not transmitted in plaintext over R-T wireless channel, it is impossible for the adversary to extract the relevant information about ID of the genuine tag by intercepting the exchanged messages without the secret values of K e , K d and
1 n n n . So ID is never disclosed in the whole process of authentication session and the robustness of ID will not be compromised. Additionally, all public messages This feature makes the exchanged data different for each tag reading so that the adversary cannot obtain the same response from the same tag in different sessions. As a consequence, it is impossible for the adversary to launch tracking attack through IDS or the exchanged messages and the location privacy of the tag owner is guarded. Hence, tracking attack can thus be prevented and all communications are unlinkable.
E. Resistance to Replay Attack
LRAP uses the randomized challenge-response to defend against replay attack, which ensures that the replay messages from the tag or the the reader will not be authenticated. The exchanged messages being randomized dynamically and independent in different sessions, the reader cannot verify the consistency between the replay B from the adversary and the local B'of the genuine reader. So the adversary can be regarded as the fake tag and replay B also fails.
Based on the above analysis, replaying Therefore, Tag Impersonation cannot succeed. Case② Reader Impersonation Resistance The adversary tries to impersonate a genuine reader by forging the unknown encryption key K e ' in current session and sends the forged challenge according  to  the  equation  of   '  3  3  3  3  3  2  1   ) , (
. Similarly, the consistency verification between the local A' and the received A is also unsuccessful. So the genuine tag regards the adversary as the fake reader.
Even if the adversary clones a genuine reader, the difficulty of obtaining the genuine K d from K e according to the equation of
is equivalent to attacking ECDLP. So it is impossible for the adversary to break through the whole RFID system, including the reader end and the tag end, by cloning a genuine reader. Therefore, Reader Impersonation cannot succeed. Hence, based on the above analysis of Case① and Case②, LRAP can defend against both the tag and the reader impersonation attack and has the property of strong unforgeability.
G. Resistance to Desynchronization Attack
The main aim of this attack is to make the tag and the reader update their local parameters respectively to different values, which leads to authenticate each other unsuccessfully for future authentication sessions. In LRAP, during the updating phase the tag stores both the old and the potential new values of Index-pseudonym IDS to avoid desynchronization attack. If the response message B sent from the tag to the reader are blocked by the adversary, the tag will update its IDS while the reader will not update the tag entry. Fortunately, this cannot cause to desynchronized state in our protocol, because the tag stores the updated IDS new and the old IDS old of the previous session. In the next authentication session the tag will respond IDS new to the reader's new challenge, but the reader cannot find the matched tag entry. And then the reader send another challenge to the reader again, the tag will send IDS old as the new response. With this IDS old , the authorized reader can acquire the genuine tag entry from TDS and then carry out the next authentication stages. Therefore the tag and the reader remain synchronization successfully.
Another possible approach to desynchronization attack is to make the reader and the tag update their local data by using different the random numbers n 1 and n 2 . But it is easy to be found that the exchanged messages are modified by the adversary over the wireless channel because of data integrity and mutual authentication in our protocol.
Hence, LRAP is immune to desynchronization attack.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this session, our protocol LRAP is now examined from the point of view of computation cost, storage requirement and communication overhead.
A. Computation Cost
According to the requirement of resource-constrained devices, all the operations used in LRAP are compliant with low-cost tags and can be very efficiently implemented on passive tags in hardware. Because encryption operation is more complex than decryption operation and random number generation to supply freshness is a costly operation for a tag, the operations of PRNG [25] , Encryption and Elliptic Curve Point Addition is carried out by the reader and the relative lightweight operations of Decryption operation, Bitwise Addition mod 2 m (+), Bitwise XOR(⊕) and Elliptic Curve Point Addition are performed by the tag. The computation cost focuses on the frequency of costly operations about PRNG [25] and Elliptic Curve Point Addition over the reader and the tag respectively.
B. Storage Requirement
In are stored in a rewritable memory EEPROM for updating in different sessions. The reader stores the pseudonym IDS of the corresponding tag in current session and the encryption key K e , which in total requires 2L bits storage.
C. Communication Overhead
Since the mutual authentication phase contributes most of the communication cost, the communication overhead in LRAP calculates the number of the exchanged messages between the reader and the tag over the wireless channel in one authentication session, which in total demands two challenge-response rounds (4Lbits) in the normal condition.
The comparison between LRAP and the previous relevant protocols is listed in TABLE IV from a performance perspective.
The comparison in TABLE IV indicates that LRAP is superior to ERAP [21] and SECRP [22] , especially in computation cost of costly operations over the tag end. Total communication overhead remains between ERAP [21] and SECRP [22] . The storage requirement is similar to these protocols [21, 22] . Hence, computation cost, storage requirement and communication overhead are lightweight except for the relatively light penalty of computation cost at the reader end.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a lightweight RFID authentication protocol based on ECC, called LRAP, without increasing computing burden at server end. To reduce the computation cost on the tag, our protocol puts the costly operations of PRNG and Encryption over the reader end. The security analysis shows that LRAP can be proven to enhance the essential security properties in RFID system with respect to user privacy against the Chao Wang was born in Nanjing Jiangsu, P.R.China, in 1989. He is currently a master in Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, P.R. China. His main research interests include information security and privacy protection technology in RFID systems etc.
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